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The general title of the symposium "The Contributions of Law to
Contemporary World Order" must be interpreted as an effort to de-
scribe the way political ideas and programs have been transformed into
legal order. Law itself is only a special technique for realizing a social
order and assuring its functioning. One of the most fruitful political
ideas that arose after the First World War was that of building a
United Europe. But only since the Second World War has it been
partially realized. This idea led to the establishment of legal orders.
It is better to use the plural, for there is as yet no European legal
order, but only, as we shall see, some partial orders.
We may distinguish horizontal and vertical legal orders.' In the
field of international organization a horizontal order is based on co-
operation among the states, whereas a vertical order is based upon
integration of the states. Co-operation does not infringe upon the sov-
ereignty of the participant states. Integration creates a Community of
states that itself exercises jurisdiction over the states. International
organizations based on co-operation do not, as a rule, involve any
departure from the framework of general international law. Commu-
nities of states based on integration create a Community law that is
neither national nor traditional international law but a legal order be-
tween the two representing a stage in an evolution from horizontal in-
ternational law to vertical international law.
Six European states took the first significant step toward integra-
tion and thus subjected themselves to a supra-national authority-
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg.2 They created the so-called European Communities-The Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom). The purpose of this paper is to describe the legal orders
of these communities and their basic principles. It is not the intention
of this paper to give a complete scientific analysis of all the legal prob-
* Referendar, Oberlandesgericht Hamm.
1 Falk, "International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal
Order," 32 Temp. L.Q. 295 (1959), especially 295-98.
2 See Efron, Reuben and Nanes, "The Common Market and Euratom Treaties:
Supranationality and the Integration of Europe," 6 Intl and Com. L.Q. 670; Kunz,
"Supra-National Organs," 46 Am. J. Intl. L. 690.
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lems raised or to suggest the place of the Community law in a coherent
European legal system. To do so would involve both exceeding the
limitations of space and anticipating developments still only on the
horizon. The law as a technique for establishing order grows with the
political society for which the order is established. However, a Euro-
pean political society is only developing, it is not yet a reality. The
European society has its common spiritual and cultural values, but is
only developing its political values.
Before we deal with the European Communities, it seems neces-
sary to describe first "The Phase of Co-operation"-briefly, the basic
difficulties which stand in the way of European unification and the
attempts to achieve a measure of unity on the basis of co-operation. In
the second part "The Phase of Integration" we shall deal with the
goals and tasks of the Communities and their functions.
This paper is concerned with existing legal orders, and it is not
its task to draw up a plan de lege feranda. We shall confine ourselves
to the description of a way of establishing a vertical order. This may,
however, give an indication of the direction a further development of
world order must take.
I. THE PHASE OF CO-OPERATION
A. The Difficulties of Unification
The necessity for European unification became clear soon after
World War II. The reasons for unification were mainly of an economic
nature, but the difficulties were very great. Every state wanted to
keep its sovereignty. Since the 15th century the states had been con-
ceived to be independent and the highest political orders of mankind.
Outside interference in the internal affairs of the state was not toler-
able. This is still the basic principle of the U.N. Article two, paragraph
seven, forbids intervention by the U.N. in matters "which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state. Several European
states were unprepared to give up a part of their sovereign power.
They were prepared only to participate in an organization on the basis
of co-operation. Other difficulties arose out of the differences in the
political positions of the European states in the world. Some are neu-
tral, as Switzerland and Austria. Others have responsibilities outside
Europe. Thus Great Britain felt that its responsibilities within the
Commonwealth made it impossible for it to adhere too closely to the
continental plans of unification. The third group of problems is a
product of history. The continental European states had fought each
other for centuries. Especially the generations-old hostility between
France and Germany had to be overcome. After the First World War
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an attempt to achieve a closer European unity had failed because of
this hostility.
B. The Attempts at Co-Operation
For these reasons the construction of a European unity began on
the basis of co-operation with OEEC and the Council of Europe. The
functioning of these organizations may be described briefly.
1. Structure and Functioning of the OEEC
The Organization of European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC)
was founded in 1948. Its members are Great Britain, France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, West Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland. It will cease to exist at the end of the year and will be
replaced by a similar organization, the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), in which the United States and
Canada are also full members. The aim of the OEEC is mainly
to strengthen by co-operation the European economy. Its organs are
a Council of Ministers, an Executive Committee, and a Secretariat.
The Council of Ministers is the decision-making organ. It makes
its decisions by unanimous vote.3 However, these decisions have no
authoritative character They have to be ratified in accordance with
the constitutional provisions of every state. 4 The Council may also
make recommendations, but these are, as usual in international law,
not binding. The OEEC thus follows the general pattern of inter-
national law-unanimity and ratification. The OEEC lacks any ele-
ment of a supranation. It is based only on co-operation. Neverthe-
less, it was by the OEEC that the European economy and free trade
between the European states were re-established.
2. The Structure and Functioning of the Council of Europe
In 1949 on the initiative of Sir Winston Churchill the same Euro-
pean states with the exception of Switzerland, Portugal and Spain
founded a European political organization designed to achieve a closer
union of the European states for the preservation and promotion of
their common inheritance.
The Council has two organs-A Committee of Ministers and a
Parliamentary Consultation Assembly. The Committee has no author-
ity to make decisions at all. It may only make recommendations to
3 Arts. 13 and 14.
4 Reuter, "Cours d'organisations Europ6ennes," p. 102 (1959-60); Les Cours de
Droit, 158 Rue Saint-Jacques-Paris Ve (hereinafter Reuter, "Cours").
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the states (art. 15). The Assembly may only deliberate and make
recommendations to the Committee but not directly to the states.
In spite of the weakness of the Council, it has won important po-
litical influence. It has become a place of discussion, of growing under-
standing, and a sort of engine for the European train toward unification.
The most famous result of its work is the European Convention on
Human Rights which has been ratified by most of the member states.
It is administered by a commission and a court.
The Council has become important in a second respect. For the
first time an international organization has a parliamentary assembly.
The assemblies of the other international organizations, such as the
League of Nations, the United Nations and the specialized agencies,
are only assemblies of government representatives. The deputies of
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe are chosen by the
national parliaments from their members. The Assembly has no pow-
ers, but it has been a decisive precedent. All of the organizations con-
stituted later have a parliamentary body. Thus, the European peoples
as well as the governments have found representation. For the united
Europe idea, it has been psychologically of great importance, even
though the power of the Assembly and the whole Council is practically
nonexistent.
These two organizations, the economic OEEC and the political
Council of Europe, were a good beginning. They encouraged a more
intensive European co-operation. However, in the long run, this was
insufficient. It was necessary, as it is necessary all over the world, to
achieve a closer relationship. The European problems became more
and more difficult. Solutions by the way of co-operation alone were
impossible. Too often the different interests did not permit a unani-
mous decision, or the projects adopted were less than satisfactory. It
became necessary to create a body that had the authority to make
authoritative decisions, binding upon the states and individuals. The
step from international co-operation to supra-national integration and
direction had to be taken. It was taken in 1950 with the famous decla-
ration of the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman,
who invited Germany and the other European states to subject their
coal and steel industries to a common High Authority. Unfortunately,
only six of the eighteen European states of the OEEC followed the
appeal of Robert Schuman. However, something entirely new was
created-the supranational community.
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II. THE PHASE OF INTEGRATION: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
A. The Historic Development and the Relations of the Communities
with Each Other
1. The Creation of the Communities
On May 9, 1950 the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert
Schuman, proposed to the other European states, principally West
Germany, that the resources and the production of coal and steel be
put under the control of a European body-the High Authority. This
body was to have the authority not only to coordinate, but also to con-
trol by directly binding decisions. It was the aim of Mr. Schuman to
overcome the hostility between France and Germany and to lay the
foundations for a general European federation. The plan itself had a pre-
federal character that limited the sovereignty of the participant states.5
Six states took part in the subsequent negotiations and became mem-
bers of the new Community-France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Great Britain refused to become a
member of the new organization because she thought her relations with
the Commonwealth precluded consent to this limitation of her sover-
eignty. The Scandinavian countries likewise found this limitation un-
acceptable. The new name "Community" for the new organization
was adopted to express the new principle that surpassed the old inter-
national organizations. The European Coal and Steel Community be-
gan its work on July 25, 1952 at Luxembourg. Its organs are a High
Authority, a Council of Ministers (both with governing powers and
the authority to make directly binding decisions), a Common Assembly,
and a Court. The latter two bodies have only controlling authority.
The goals of the Community are to establish a common market for
coal and steel, to abolish trade restrictions and discriminations based
on nationality, and to develop thereby the European economy. The
common market was established in 1957. Since that time the market
for coal and steel has lost all characteristics of an internal market.
The North-Korean attack on South-Korea and the resulting war
led to plans for German rearmament by the United States. The United
States and other NATO states feared that something similar would
happen in Germany, where East Germany already possessed strong
para-military forces. However, France feared an independent German
"Wehrmacht." To provide against the dangers of a German military
renaissance the then French Prime Minister, Pleven, proposed the
European Defence Community (EDC). This community was based
on the same principles as the European Coal and Steel Community. It
contemplated integrated armies under a supranational command. The
5 See 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 183 (1953); 4 Int. Org. 524 (1950).
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limitation of sovereignty was even greater than in the ECSC, and con-
cerned the major powers of a state-its foreign and military affairs.
A treaty was negotiated between the six states of the ECSC. Great
Britain was to become an associated member. However, Europe was
not yet able to accept these far reaching consequences and on August
30, 1954 the French Parliament rejected the treaty.
During the negotiation of the EDC treaty the ECSC began to
function. At the request of the ministers of foreign affairs of the "Six"
the Assembly prepared a plan for a general European political com-
munity, the logical consequence of the EDC. This community would
have come very near to the establishment of a federal European state.
However this project did not even become the subject of negotiations
between the states. After the rejection of the EDC, the European idea
was set back for several years. Only in private and semi-official cir-
cles was it kept alive. Paul Monnet, the initiator and first president of
the ECSC was particularly active.
In 1955 the ministers of foreign affairs of the "Six" met in Mes-
sins. The European economic problems called for mutual solutions.
The ECSC was only a starting point. Its scope of activity was too
small. If a general political community was impossible, it was at least
possible to continue in the way opened by the ECSC and to reach a
closer association in the economic field. The conference decided to
appoint a commission under the presidency of Paul-Henri Spaak, an-
other ardent European statesman, to study the possibilities of a com-
mon European market, a European atomic energy organization and a
European investment bank. Independently of the governments, this
commission worked out plans that were discussed in Venice in June,
1956. The negotiations for treaties concerning the Common Market,
to which the investment bank was related politically, and the European
Atomic Community continued until March, 1957. Again the "Six"
were alone. The treaties for the "European Economic Community" and
the "European Atomic Community" were signed at Rome on March
27, 1957, and the two communities started work on January 1, 1958.
The first task of the EEC was to establish the Common Market.
This will be completed at the latest in 1972. It will embrace free trade
in products, the free exchange of capital and the free circulation of
services and labor. The main task of Euratom is to further the devel-
opment of nuclear energy and to provide on a European scale the en-
ergy necessary to enlarge the European economy. Both communities
have an institutional pattern similar to the ECSC-two governing or-
gans, a Commission and a Council of Ministers; and two controlling
organs, a parliamentary Assembly and a Court.
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2. The Relations of the Communities with Each Other
The historic development has not led to a single general political
community but rather to three communities in the economic field and
thus to three different political orders. Not even in this restricted area
did the states succeed in establishing a single community.6 This, of
course, is an important handicap to the efficiency of the European com-
munities. Another great disadvantage is the limitation to the six con-
tinental states. It would have been desirable if at least Great Britain
had participated. Now Great Britain and other states have founded
a free trade area that stands in many respects in opposition to the
EEC. Thus the spiritual and cultural unity of Europe is actually di-
vided into three parts-the Europe of the "Six," the free trade area,
and the OEEC and its successors-with all three united politically at
least in the Council of Europe. The task of the future will be to unite
these three parts again to form a European continent in the political
sense of the term.
To return to the subject of this paper, the three communities are
separate organizations, each independent of the others and each hav-
ing its own scope of authority. Each has its own legal basis in the
respective treaties. Each has its own field of action in which the other
communities may not interfere. As to the EEC, the general economic
community, it is explicitly stated in art. 232 that the treaty does not
interfere in any way with the provisions of the other two treaties.
Only where the EEC takes the place of the states within the ECSC
and Euratom, as to the general commerce policy, will the EEC take
the appropriate action rather than the states.' Also, the organs of the
three communities are separate and perform different tasks for the
different Communities. Each Community has its two governing organs
and its two controlling organs. The governing organs are separate, as
are the councils of ministers. Unlike the Parliament and the Court
they have not been unified by a special provision. Their authority
inside the communities is too different to permit unification. There
exist three councils in law and fact.S The parliaments and the courts
6 Actually several proposals have been made for a fusion of the three Communities,
especially by the European Parliament. However, there are significant obstacles. Par-
ticularly, the President of France hesitates, because he fears that the new single Com-
munity would become too strong.
7 Carstens, "Die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes in der Europdischen Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft, Atomgemeinschaft und der Europcischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle
und Stahl," 18 Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches bffentliches Recht und Vilkerrecht, 467.
If, in 2002, the ECSC treaty ends without renewal the whole field of coal and steel
will come under the authority of the EEC (hereinafter: Carstens, "Gemeinsamer
Markt").
8 Contra, Hahn, "Euratom: The Conception of an International Personality," 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1008 (1958).
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have been unified by a special agreement between the six states. How-
ever, their function for each community is different and still rests on
the provisions of the respective treaties. We shall see below, how far
reaching these differences are. While the European Parliament' tries
to work out a general pattern for all three communities, the court is
strictly bound by the different provisions of the treaties. If we take
a look at its rules of procedure we will see that they differ for each
of the three communities. Nevertheless, the fact that two organs
of great importance are the same for all three communities has a
favorable impact upon the European development and provides one
point of support for a fusion of the three into one general community.
B. Goals and Tasks of the Communities
1. Goals and Tasks of the ECSC
The basic goals and duties of the ECSC are set forth in arts. 2
through 4 of the treaty. All action of the Community must be author-
ized by these provisions. They contain the "basic philosophy" of the
treaty. Art. 2 defines it as follows:
The European Coal and Steel Community is called upon to con-
tribute, in harmony with the general economy of the Member-
States and on the basis of a common market as defined by article 4,
to the economic expansion, .to the development of the employment
and to the raising of the standard of life in the Member-States.
The Common Market, the core of the Community, is based upon
two principles: no impediment to interstate commerce, be it by state
measures, as custom duties, taxes or quotas or other discrimination on
the basis of origin, or by private action, as by the division of markets,
etc.; and no distortion of the conditions of competition, be it by state
subsidies or by private practices of unfair competition, such as con-
centrations, cartels, etc. In art. 3 the general aims of art. 2 are split
off into partial objectives. The organs have a threefold duty: (a) to
watch over the regular supply of the common market, the establish-
ment of low prices, and the continuation of the conditions which allow
the expansion of productivity, (b) to assure equal access to goods pro-
duced in the common market to all consumers, (c) to promote the
improvement of the conditions of life and work of the workers, the
development of interstate commerce, the expansion and moderniza-
tion of production and the improvement of quality.
These three articles contain the "quasi-constitutional law" of the
Community. They may be changed only by the member-states and
9 The original name was "Assembly." The "Assembly" lost this name of its own
motion during its first session in Februray 1958.
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not by the Community itself (art. 95, par. 3-4). The Court defined
the importance of these provisions in its first decision with these words:
The . . . arts. 2, 3, and 4 of the treaty represent fundamental
provisions, that lay down the definition of the common market and
the objectives of the Community.10
In another decision the Court said:
These provisions have . . . coercive character and must be taken
together into consideration, so that their appropriate application
is assured."-
They are norms which bind the Community directly by the prohibition
of certain discriminatory practices.' 2
The quasi-constitutional provisions of arts. 2 through 4 are sup-
plemented in the treaty itself particularly in the "Third Part," "Eco-
nomic and Social Disposition,"'13 and especially in arts. 57 through 67
concerning crises, and the areas of prices, discrimination and concen-
tration. The treaty by virtue of these provisions has become a "Euro-
pean economic code." 4 A solid basis has been established upon which
the High Authority may take action to fulfill its duties under arts. 2
through 4. But, at the same time, by well-defined and carefully cir-
cumscribed competencies, the High Authority has been given a general
but limited sphere of action. Thus a system of binding norms has been
created that allows the High Authority considerable discretion. It is
not merely a technical but a governing organ.' 5
10 The decisions are cited following the German reports: Government of the
French Republic v. Hobe Beg6rde, 21st dec. 1954, gerichtshof der EGKS, Sammlung
der Rechtsprechung F, at 23.
"1 Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Aciries Belges versus Hobe Behorde,
Gerichtshof der EGKS, 4 Sammlung der Rachtsprechung 231 (at 253).
12 Jaenicke, "Die Europiische Gemeinschaft fir Kohle und Stahl (Montan-Union),
Struktur und Funktionen der Organe," 14 Zeitschrift fir auslindisches Uffentliches Recht
und V6lkerrecht 727 (hereinafter, Jaenicke, "Montan-Union") at 773 and 737; Mosler,
"Zur Anwendung der Grundsatzartikel des Vertrages fiber die Europiiische Gemeinschaft
fir Kohle und Stahl," 17 Zeitschrift fur ausl~indisches Wffentllches Recht und V6lkerrecht
407 (hereinafter, Mosler, "Grundsatzartikel") at 409; Cf. Reuter "La Communaut6
Europ~enne du Charbon et de L'Acier," Paris 1953 (hereinafter: Reuter, "CECA") 45.
13 The double character has been made dear by judge Catalano in "Congress Inter-
nationale des Etudes sur la CECA," 2 Actes Officiels Milano 187 (1957)--"Le Traiti
contient & la fois les normes d'orde constitutionel de la Communaut6 et les dispositions
constituant la loi unique et fondamentale du March6 Commun."
14 Reuter, "Cours" at 222. Others called the treaty "the statute" of the Com-
munity, Lagrange, "Le charctre supranational des pouvoirs et leur articulation dans le
Cadre de la CECA," 13 (1953); Judge Catalano supra note 14.
15 Reuter, "CECA," at 84,-"Le poids des responsabillt~s naturelles de la Haute
Autorit6 d~signe la Haute Autorit6 comme un pouvoir gouvernemental."
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2. Goals and Tasks of the EEC
The key provision of the treaty is art. 2. It defines the basic
objectives of the EEC (in a form similar to that of art. 2 of the ECSC
treaty):
The Community has the mission to promote by the establishment
of a Common Market and the gradual approach of the economic
policies of the Member-States an harmonic development of the
economic life within the Community, a steady and weighed eco-
nomic expansion, a greater stability, an accelerated rising of the
standard of life and closer relations between the states, which are
united in the Community.
Subsequent provisions contain the procedure to be followed in
establishing the Common Market and advancing the economic poli-
cies. Art. 3 enumerates the different actions to be taken. There are
eleven groups of action, of which the most important are the abolition
of custom duties and quotas between the member-states, the introduc-
tion of common custom tariffs at the boundaries of the Community,
the abolition of impediments for services and capital, and the intro-
duction of common systems of protection against unfair competition.
All these actions are to be taken by the states within a 12 year transi-
tion period which is subdivided into three parts. The organs of the
Community may exercise only limited pressure, provide information,
and make proposals. Only if this Common Market is established will
the policies in the fields of agriculture, transportation, and commerce
become unified within the competence of the Community. The EEC
as such does not yet really exist in that its core, the Common Market,
has not yet been realized. Only the institutional frame exists. The
real Community is still developing. Aside from the provisions con-
cerning the institutional pattern or frame, the treaty contains almost
exclusively procedural regulations for the transition period. Most of
the provisions will become inoperative in 1970 at the latest. On the
other hand, for the subsequent period, nothing is provided. Only for
the agricultural sector does the treaty state the general lines that are
to be followed. 10
The EEC has no "basic philosophy" as has the ECSC treaty. Its
organs are not strictly bound by a tightly woven net of substantive
norms. They have to create the norms themselves, especially after the
transition period, on the basis of some fundamental principles. The
Community itself has to issue the regulations to transform the prin-
ciples into applicable binding norms. This is the major difference from
16 Theoretically the Community organs are free to follow either an extreme capi-
talist or an extreme socialist policy. There is no real basis for a common policy, see
Reuter "Cours" at 225.
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the ECSC treaty for the Council and commissions of the EEC have a
quasi-legislative competence.17 This is indeed an important step in the
direction of a united Europe, however much depends upon the decision
maker. The EEC treaty contains only the institutional frame." It
has an almost exclusively constitutional character.
3. Goals and Tasks of Euratom
The formulation of the basic objective of Euratom is found in
art. 1, par. 211 which provides:
The Community has the mission to contribute by the creation of
the conditions necessary for the formation and the development of
the nuclear industries, to the raising of the standard of living in the
Member-States, and to the development of the relations with other
states.
This general "mission" or "objective" of Euratom is the same as for
the other communities-the raising of the standard of living. How-
ever, it is to be reached by other means. The common market is only
of minor importance. The nuclear energy must first be developed by
research and the construction of power plants. This demands consid-
erable human intelligence and large capital investments. The several
European states are not able to undertake these efforts individually.
Therefore, the main task of Euratom is to coordinate and combine the
potential of the states. Besides, the Community has to assure that
security measures are taken and that nuclear materials, especially
uranium are available. All these tasks are enumerated in art. 2 of the
treaty. The Second Part, "Promotion of the Progress on the Field of
Nuclear Energy," regulates the tasks enumerated in art. 2, in more
detail.
Thus the Euratom treaty is more similar to that of the ECSC than
to the EEC treaty."0 It not only establishes the institutional frame but
also creates concrete regulations. In some respect it also contains leg-
islative norms. But on the other hand, it leaves room enough to the
organs of the Community for quasi-legislative action.
4. Conclusion
The basic economic principle of all three Communities is a "Com-
mon Market." This is a market in which commerce between the
17 Cf. Reuter, "Cours" at 225; contra Hraud, "Observations sur la Nature
Juridique de la Communaut6 Economique Europ~ene," 1958 Revue G~n~rale du Droit
International Public 31.
18 Reuter, "Cours" at 223 calls it therefore a "trait6-cadr6"--frame treaty.
10 See for Euratom the instructive article by Hahn, "Euratom, The Conception of
an International Personality," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1001-1056 (1958).
20 Reuter, "Cours" at 223.
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member-states is free from restrictions of all kinds and in which uni-
form rules governing trade with non-member states are established.2'
For the EEC and Euratom the common market is linked by the treaty
with a customs-union. The ECSC treaty does not provide for a cus-
toms-union but the practical development has in fact led to it. Where-
as in ECSC and EEC the common market is the core of the Commu-
nity, in Euratom the common market plays only a minor role. On the
other hand this Community has a certain monopoly of the supply of
basic nuclear material. 22
The main difference between the ECSC and the EEC lies in the
fact that the ECSC treaty contains the entire law of the Community
whereas the EEC treaty creates only the institutional frame.2 3 The
legislative competence given the EEC is a forward step which could
make possible the integration of the "Six" and perhaps lead to a federal
organization. Although this competence is supranational in character,
it is of great political importance to see who may exercise this com-
petence, since the decision maker may determine how this competence
will be exercised.
C. The Functioning of the Communities
1. The Institutional Pattern of the Communities
The institutional pattern is similar for all three communities.
They have four organs-two governing organs, an integrated organ
and a Council of Ministers; and two controlling organs, a Parliament
and a Court.24 The parliaments and the courts are unified into a single
Parliament and a single Court by a special agreement. The governing
organs, including the councils, are separate for each community.2 5
The members of the integrated organs, the High Authority for
the ECSC, and the Commissions for the EEC and Euratom, are nomi-
nated by the government for their "general competence," and, in the
case of the High Authority, additional members are chosen by coopta-
tion. The High Authority and the Commission of the EEC have nine
21 Carstens, "Gemeinsamer Markt" at 460; also, Robertson, "European Institutions:
Co-operation, Integration, Unification," London, 1959. This treatise may be recom-
mended as the most instructive study of the European organizations in the English
language.
22 Reuter, "Cours" at 263-64.
23 See in general, Reuter, "Cours" at 222 and the very instructive analysis by the
former Belgian Deputy of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, Pierre de Wigny, later
the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "The Parliamentary Assembly in the Europe
of the Six," Doc. Nr 14 of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, 1957-58. It exists in
all four official languages of the ECSC and, presumably, also in English.
24 Art. 7, ECSC treaty, art. 4, EEC treaty, art. 3, Euratom treaty.
25 Supra note 8.
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members. The Commission of Euratom has five members.2" After
their nomination they may not accept any instructions or orders from
their governments. They make their decisions absolutely independent
of state influence by simple majority vote.2 7 The integrated organs are
supranational European bodies."'
The Councils of Ministers are not supra-national but international
organs. They represent the states within the Communities. Their
members are state delegated and bound by the instructions of their
governments. However, the Councils are organs of the Communities
and not a sort of permanent state conference. They make their deci-
sions in the name of the Communities and the decisions constitute
Community and not state, law. The decisions are made in different
ways-by unanimous vote, by qualified vote and by simple majority
vote.20 This depends upon the importance of the decision. The great-
est impediment to the development of integration is the unanimous
vote. It is used very often in the EEC, where the Council has the main
decision-making power. However, in most cases it will be replaced by
a qualified vote during the transition period."
The European Parliament"' consists of 142 deputies-36 from
France, Germany and Italy, 14 from the Netherlands and Belgium,
and 6 from Luxembourg.32 They are elected by the national parlia-
ments from among their members. However, plans exist for direct
election by the people of the states. But even now the deputies are
independent because they are not representatives of the governments
but of the people of the Communities. The Parliament is a supra-
national organ. It has no decision-making power. It only deliberates,
it does not legislate.33 The Parliament, nevertheless, has become one
of the most active parts of the Communities. It has sought to enlarge
its competence as far as possible.
20 Art. 10, ECSC treaty; art. 158, EEC treaty; art. 127, Euratom treaty.
27 Art. 9, par. 5, ECSC treaty; art. 157, par. 2, EEC treaty; art. 126, par. 2,
Euratom treaty.
28 It is in this connection that this expression appears in the ECSC treaty. In the
other treaties it has been omitted for political reasons. However, it is the same for the
commissions of the EEC and Euratom.
29 Art. 28, ECSC treaty; art. 148, EEC treaty; art. 118, Euratom treaty. What
majority is actually required is regulated by the respective provisions that give the
competence of decision.
30 See e.g., arts. 28, 43, 75 and 87, EEC treaty.
31 In the treaties it is called "Assembly." The Assembly, however, took this name
during its first session.
32 Art. 21, ECSC treaty; art. 138, EEC treaty; art. 108, Euratom treaty.
33 Art. 20, ECSC treaty; art. 137, EEC treaty; art. 107, Euratom treaty. The
deputies are not grouped according to their nationality but according to their party
affiliations-Christian-Democrats, Socialists, liberals.
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The judicial control is exercised by the Court of the European
Communities. It consists of seven judges. They are nominated by the
governments for six years. 4 The judges exercise their function with
complete independence. They are bound only by the law. Thus, the
Court is also a true supra-national organ. Its decisions appear as deci-
sions of the whole Court, even if they have been taken by majority
vote. The Court, following the continental tradition, does not use
dissenting opinions. It is assisted by two attorney-generals.3 5
Every community has one or more consultative bodies consisting
of representatives of the industrialists, trade unions, consumers, scien-
tists and other interested groups of the communities.30 The treaties
themselves prescribe the cases in which they are to be heard. However,
they may be consulted as often as the governing organs wish to do so.
These bodies have no decision-making power.
2. The Competences of the Governing Organs in General
It is the governing organs that bear the responsibility for the ful-
fillment of the objectives and tasks of the Communities. They are the
active part and are leading toward and developing European integra-
tion. They regulate economic problems. They are, in a figurative sense,
the economic government of the Europe of the Six. To fulfill their tasks
the governing organs were endowed with special competences to regu-
late and to intervene both indirectly and directly. They exercise these
competences with respect to the states and with respect to individuals.
This is the core of the supra-nationality of the Communities.3 7 The
Communities have no general competence as states; they are not
sovereign. Their authority is functional. It is limited on the one hand
by their functions and on the other by special provisions that estab-
lish each particular competence.3 8 However, every treaty provides for
34 Art. 32, ECSC treaty; art. 167, EEC treaty; art. 139, Euratom treaty.
35 Arts. 11-13 of the Statute of the Court, appendix of the ECSC treaty; art. 166,
EEC treaty; art. 138, Euratom treaty.
36 ECSC, Consultative Committee, art. 18, ECSC treaty; EEC and Euratom, Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, art. 193, EEC treaty, art. 165, Euratom treaty; EEC
Monetary Committee, art. 105 EEC treaty, Transport-Committee, art. 83, EEC treaty;
Euratom, Committee of Science and Technology, art. 134 Euratom treaty.
37 Carstens, "Gemeinsamer Markt" at 459. It could be doubted whether the par-
ticulars are also within the competence of the EEC organs, because there is nothing
in the treaty itself. However, this is due only to the general character of the treaty as
described above. The legislative acts, which will be issued by the EEC, will create rights
and duties also and mainly for the particulars. Reuter, "Aspects de ]a CEE," 1 Revue
du March6 Commun 6-14, 160-168, 310-316 (hereinafter Reuter, "Aspects") at 167.
38 For the ECSC, but the same is valid for the EEC and Euratom: Visscher,
"Congr~s International des Etudes sur la CECA," 2 Actes Officiels 7-85, Milano 1957 at
28; Constantinesco, same volume at 217.
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extraordinary "implied powers,"39 e.g., the power "without which the
provisions of the treaty are meaningless and not practicable, reasonable
and appropriate."4 However, these provisions must be interpreted
restrictively.
We may distinguish indirect measures and direct intervention.
Indirect measures are, following the definition of the court, those meas-
ures that "create by influencing the fundamental factors of the econ-
omy, conditions that offer a stimulus to the enterprises to behave on
their own initiative as the High Authority wishes, having in mind the
realization of the tasks that the treaty has transferred to it." Direct
interventions, on the other hand, "compel the enterprises directly to
act as the High Authority deems necessary with regard to the situation
that it has to control according to the treaty."" These definitions are
valid also for the two other communities. Whether indirect measures
or direct interventions are in order depends upon the situation that
must be remedied.42 The range of indirect measures is very great. It
encompasses all manner of influence, even the establishment of maxi-
mum and minimum prices. All three Communities make extensive use
of them.4
3
Direct intervention takes different forms. The ECSC treaty
distinguishes decisions and recommendations. The decisions may be
general or specific and are directly binding upon the addressees in all
respects. The recommendations are binding only with respect to the
objective, which the addressee may achieve as he deems best. The
EEC and Euratom treaties distinguish ordinances, decisions, and in-
structions. The ordinances, which replace largely the "general deci-
sions" of the ECSC, have general validity. They are directly binding
in all respects in all member-states. The instructions have the same
legal effect as the recommendations of the ECSC. The decisions also
are directly binding upon the addressees in all respects. It has been
debated whether the two Communities can also issue general decisions
39 Art. 95, par. 1-2, ECSC treaty; art. 235, EEC treaty; art. 203, Euratom treaty.
40 The Court in Fidgration Charboni~re de Belgique v. Hohe Behirde, Gerichtshof
EGKS, July 16th 1956, 2 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung 199 at 312.
41 Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Aci6ries Belges v. Hohe Behirde, Gerichts of
der EGKS, 4 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung 231 at 260 (translation by the writer).
42 Only the ESCS treaty prescribes in what field of production indirect measures
have priority over direct interventions (art. 57). However, with this exception there is
no general rule that indirect measures have priority.
43 See, for an intensive study, Reuter, report on the "Congris International des
Etudes sur ]a CECA," 5 Actes Officiels, Milano 1957, at 56.; Schiile, "Marktinteerven-
tionen der Hoben Behirde und finanzielle Einrichtung," 19 Zeitschrift fiir auslundisches
bffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht 464 and the decision of the Court supra note 43.
These texts concern only the ECSC, but in general the arguments are valid also for the
two other Communities, which may both employ many forms of indirect measures.
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other than ordinances. The treaties themselves provide for decisions
affecting only some (but not named) individuals, and there are, be-
tween ordinances that affect the whole community and decisions that
concern only one or a group of named addressees, general decisions
affecting only some of the states or individuals.44
The distinctions between ordinances, general decisions, individual
decisions and instructions or recommendations are ones of legal form.
Another distinction may be made in terms of the function of the law
creating process. This process consists of four steps-creation of con-
stitutional regulations, legislative regulations, executive regulations and
individual legal acts. All four of these categories may also be found
in the formation of community law by the governing organs. The con-
stitutional regulations are contained in the treaties and they may be
created by amendment to their provisions. The legislative regulations
are the ordinances and general decisions45 that create a system of gen-
eral compulsory provisions in realization of the general tasks of the
communities. The executive regulations are those ordinances and gen-
eral decisions that carry out, in a general form, already binding norms
of the treaties or legislative regulations with regard to a special situa-
tion. It must be noted that the distinctions between these two kinds of
regulations are very difficult to discern, much more so than in state
law.46 Because of the differences in form, we call these categories
"quasi-constitutional" and "quasi-legislative" regulations. However,
the distinction must be made because different rules apply. The indi-
vidual decisions may be orders, prohibitions, grants of privileges or
statements of fact.47 While this function is executive in character, it
may be combined with the authority to issue executive regulations.
Thus, there may be distinguished three categories of functions-a
quasi-constitutional function, a quasi-legislative function and an execu-
tive function. In the following paragraph we shall try to briefly demon-
strate how these functions are exercised.
3. The Competences of the Governing Organs in Detail
The three defined categories of functions are, in general, state
functions. However, the states gave up their competences in certain
44 See Daig, "Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europlischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und
der Europ~ischen Atomgemeinschaft," 83 Archiv des M3ffentlichen Rechts (hereinafter,
Daig, "Gerichtsbarkeit") at 166 and 30. A classification of the different acts is given
also by Reuter, "Cours" at 109-16.
45 The normative character of the general decisions has been recognized in different
judgments of the Court. E.g., Fa. I. Nold KG v. Hobe Behbrde, Gerichtshof der
Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 5 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung at 112.
46 Cf. Pescatore, "Les Aspects Juridiques du March6 Commun, Liege" at 66 (1958).
47 Fa. I. Nold KG v. Hohe Beh rde, supra note 47.
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fields and left these fields to the powers of the Communities as laid
down and circumscribed in the treaties. The Communities now exercise
in these fields original functions based on their own will. The states
have subjected themselves, as well as their inhabitants, to these powers.
The treaties have a double character. They are international trea-
ties and constitutional instruments of the communities established by
them. The states as parties to the treaties retained for themselves the
general power to change the treaties following the common procedure
of international law. But, nevertheless, the Communities were given
the authority to carry out some autonomous changes, which do not
need ratification by the states and are directly binding on them. Thus,
art. 95, par. 3-4 ECSC treaty gives authority to the Community to
change under certain circumstances those provisions of the treaty that
concern the competence of the High Authority. The proposals are
worked out by the High Authority and the Council, presented to the
Court for examination, and then accepted by the Parliament. The
Parliament may not amend the proposal made by the governing
organs.48
The other two treaties do not have such a general quasi-consti-
tutional authority except in special cases. In the EEC they are of
minor importance. Nevertheless, it is important in principle that these
changes can be made only by the governing organs. The Council de-
cides finally and the Parliament-must be heard only in some cases.49 In
Euratom the power to amend concerns the major chapters regulating
the supply of material for the production of nuclear energy, art. 76;
security in the production plants, art. 85; and title to the basic ma-
terial, art. 90. These three chapters together with the chapters concern-
ing research, the protection of health, and the common market, are the
core of the treaty. Actually, there are no limits to the kind of changes
which may be made. For both communities the amending procedure
has become easier. The councils decide on proposals by the commis-
sions. The Parliament has only an advisory position. The Court does
not participate. However, while the final decision rests with the Coun-
cils, the interests of the states may not be by-passed.
The quasi-constitutional power of the three communities is a for-
ward step with regard to international organizations. However, it is
still too limited and too dependent upon the states. Only if the power
48 This procedure has been used once (change of art. 56). The first proposition
was refused by the Court. Eighth General Report of the Activity of the High Authority
1959-60, German version 282-86, and the advice of the Court 5 Sammlung der
Rechtsprechung 553.
49 See e.g., art. 126, EEC treaty regarding the social fund and art. 200, EEC treaty
regarding financial contributions.
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to amend is concentrated in the Parliament elected in direct elections,
can the communities become really independent.
The quasi-legislative competence is practically nonexistent in the
ECSC because the treaty is itself the fundamental law of the Com-
munity and leaves no room for legislation by the Community. 0 But it
is quite different for the EEC. Although the treaty is largely confined
to the establishment of an institutional frame for the Community it
contemplates considerable quasi-legislative activity. If the Community
becomes fully functional after the transition period, the community
organs will have broad powers in the highly important fields of agri-
culture, trade, commerce, and transportationY' The formation of a
common policy is up to the states during the transition period, but once
this period is over it is the Community that will be responsible. The
provisions of the treaty concerning these fields contain only more or less
precise general principles; not specific, directly applicable norms. This
demands an intensive quasi-legislative activity by the Community.52
In addition to this general quasi-legislative authority after the transi-
tion period, the Community has some quasi-legislative powers during
this period concerning both these four fields and some other special
areas. Thus, the treaty forbids discrimination, but leaves it to the
Council to regulate it in detail. The same procedure is followed with
respect to the freedom to work where one wishes (arts. 49 and 51).
In all cases the Council decides on the basis of proposals by the Com-
mission. In some cases the Parliament must be heard. The Council
makes its decisions by unanimous vote (arts. 51 and 103) or by a
qualified majority (arts. 7, 79 and 113). In some cases the mode of
voting changes from a unanimous vote to a qualified majority (art. 75).
The quasi-legislative competence of Euratom is further developed
than in the ECSC but not so far as in the EEC. The most important
cases concern security matters (art. 24) and the protection of health
(art. 31). It is again the Council that decides on proposals of the Com-
mission.
The executive power is much more comprehensive than that of
the legislature. It is the basis of the daily work of the Communi-
ties. It is not a general power for any of the three Communities. The
communities even here only have the power specifically laid down in
the treaties.53
50 Cf. Reuter, CECA at 47 and 99, Judge Catalano, supra note 14 at 187.
51 Arts. 38-47, arts. 74-84, art. 103, arts. 110-116.
52 Reuter "Aspects" at 162. Even if general economic policy remains within the
competence of the states, they may be obliged to coordinate their polices because the
main parts of the economic questions are under the authority of the Community.
53 Lagrange, supra note 14 at 11; "Institut des Relations Internationales: Etudes
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In the ECSC the executive regulations are of greatest importance,
since the treaty itself is the law that must be executed. The compe-
tence of the ECSC to issue executive regulations is manifold. Thus, in
the case of a crisis, be it through overproduction or shortages, quotas
and priorities must be established (arts. 58 and 59). With regard to
prices, the High Authority may define forbidden practices, prescribe
the forms of publication, establish certain price areas, and fix mini-
mum and maximum prices (arts. 60 and 61). In the field of trade
restraints, the High Authority regulates by ordinances, several ques-
tions left open by the treaty (art. 66).
Because the EEC treaty is only an institutional treaty the main
regulations are of a quasi-legislative character. However, in some cases
the treaty establishes binding regulations but leaves it to the governing
organs to fill in the details. Thus, for instance, arts. 85, 86, 92, and 93
forbid private restrictions on competition and state distortion through
subsidies. These prohibitions are directly binding. However, the Coun-
cil must regulate the details by ordinances on proposal of the Com-
mission (arts. 87 and 94).
The Commission has minor executive powers, the most important
of which concern the licensing of protective measures by the states
during the transition period, e.g., art. 37, par. 3; art. 46, art. 73 and in
general art. 226. These licenses are general because they themselves
contain the conditions and details of the protective measures. Of
special importance are the provisions of art. 121 and art. 155 par. 2,
no. 4. The Council may, under these provisions, transfer to the Com-
mission the authority to issue all regulations that are necessary to
administer the quasi-legislative acts of the Council."4
For Euratom the situation is similar to that of the EEC; however,
the authority is much more limited. The Council does not issue execu-
tive regulations. The Commission has competence only in a few cases.
The most important concern the mode of exchange of research find-
ings in the member-states (art. 15, a-d) and accounting for nuclear
material by the enterprises (art. 79). As in the EEC treaty, art. 124,
par. 2, no. 4 of the Euratom treaty provides for the transfer of execu-
tive power to the Commission by the Council.
By their authority to issue executive regulations, the Communi-
sur ]a CECA," Bruxelles at 33 (1953); Visscher, supra note 40 at 52; contra, Reuter,
"1CECA" at 49, the Commission of Euratom 1958 Journal Officiel 417; contra Kraushaar,
"Zur Kompetenz der Kommissionen der Europiischen Gemeinschaften zum Erlass von
Verordnungen," 1959 Die 0ffentliche Verwaltung 726.
r4 See e.g., art. 26 of Ordonnace No. 11 of the Council of Ministers of the EEC
concerning the tariff rates according to art. 79, par. 3, EEC treaty, German version
1960 Amtsblatt 1121.
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ties may create a coherent body of Community lawY5 These rules con-
cern mainly the enterprises and individuals and obligate them directly.
In the ECSC and Euratom it is almost exclusively the integrated or-
gans that issue the executive regulations. In the EEC the Council is
still more important than the Commission in this field, but even there
the authority of the Commission is more extensive with respect to
executive regulations than in the field of quasi-legislative competence.
By their individual decisions, the governing bodies may, like a
state agency, obligate the inhabitants of the state to take special action
and even to enforce the decisions by fines. In the ECSC the High
Authority may direct individual decisions against the states as well
as against private enterprises. The latter are more important. The
major competence again concerns prices, unfair competition and com-
binations. The High Authority may suspend certain price privileges
of the treaty for a particular business (art. 60, par. 2). It may licence
cartels only under certain conditions, or it may revoke a former licence
(art. 65). It may force forbidden cartels or combinations to dissolve
or even utilize a compulsory sale for this purpose (art. 66, par. 5).
The High Authority has the added power to enforce by fines (arts. 64,
65 and 66).
The EEC treaty provides for only a few individual decisions:6
This is again due to the special construction of the treaty. Individual
decisions presuppose general norms. They must be created by the
Council. The Council, then, transfers the necessary authority under
art. 155 to the Commission.57 However, in some cases the Council or
the Commission may, even during the transition period, issue indi-
vidual decisions, especially concerning private restrictive practices
(arts. 25, 33). Coercive measures are not provided for by the treaty,
but may be created by the Council."
The Commission of Euratom has the power to make individual
decisions mainly in the fields concerning security and safety matters.
In the latter it may employ coercive measures, as sequestration (art.
83). Here again, the competence may be enlarged by the Council fol-
lowing art. 124, to assure the realization of the quasi-legislative acts
of the Council.
The power to make individual decisions is already far reaching in
the ECSC and may be enlarged in the two other Communities. It is
55 Maurice Lagrange, supra note 15, at 11; Institut des Relations Internationales,
Etudes sur la CECA, Bruxelles 1953, at 33; Visscher, supra note 40, at 52.
56 See for instance art. 26 of the Ordonnace No. 11 of the Council of Ministers of
the EEC concerning the tariff-rates according to art. 79 par. 3 EEC-treaty, German
version: 1960 Amtsblatt 1121.
57 Ibid.
58 Art. 17, 18 of the ordonnance, supra note 56.
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of special importance that the Communities have the means to force
the addressees to obey their orders, or may acquire these means. All
three treaties provide that the decisions that impose the obligation of
a payment must be executed by the states following their execution
procedures. Only the authenticity of the decision may be verified, not
the legality. 9
D. The Control
The governing bodies of the communities are subjected to a dou-
ble control: The political control of the Parliament and the judicial
control of the Court.
1. Political Control
The Parliament has the authority to control the governing organs
and to deliberate.6 0 Both of course are closely related. Thus, the Par-
liament has gained the competence to deliberate on ECSC matters in
spite of the fact that art. 20 of the ECSC treaty provides only for con-
trol. The Parliament exercises its control by its deliberations on and
discussions of the General Reports that the integrated organs have to
submit every year, and of the special actions taken by the governing
organs. The Parliament may overthrow the integrated organs by a
vote of "no confidence." 6' But it has no influence in the reconstituting
of the integrated organs. The Parliament also has no influence upon
the Councils. It tries to exercise some influence by special meetings,
but the great disadvantage remains. It is especially great in the case
of the EEC, where the Council makes the main decisions. In spite of
the fact that the Parliament was very active from the beginning, it
could not overcome its structural weakness. This could only be done
by changing the treaties. Nevertheless, the Parliament has become the
main center of European integration.
2. Judicial Control
The judicial control is more effective than the political control
and covers all acts of the governing organs. Although the court is the
same for all three communities, the control is regulated differently for
the ECSC than for the two other Communities. We shall describe
them separately.
The basis of the judicial control of the actions of the High Author-
ity is art. 33. The court may annul every decision, whether general
or individual, and any recommendation of the High Authority that has
59 Art. 92 ECSC-treaty; art. 192 EEC-treaty.
6O Art. 20 ECSC-treaty; art. 137 EEC-treaty; art. 107 Euratom-treaty.
61 Art. 24 ECSC-treaty; art. 144 EEC-treaty; art. 114 Euratom-treaty.
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been attacked by the Council or the states on the following grounds:
Incompetence, violation of a formal or substantive norm of the treaty
or a regulation, and abuse of power. Private enterprises may attack
individual decisions on the same grounds. They may sue the High
Authority for a general decision only on the ground of alleged abuse
of power affecting them. This provision means, following the inter-
pretation by the court, that the enterprise must be "the object or at
least the victim of the asserted abuse of power."'62
Of great importance is art. 36, par. 3. It provides that an enter-
prise that has been fined for violation of a general decision may attack
the fine on the ground that the general decision is invalid. The court
has found in art. 36, par. 3, the general principle "that illegal general
decisions may not be applied to the enterprises and that no legal duties
of the enterprises may be deduced from those decisions. The provi-
sions of art. 36 do not constitute, in the opinion of the court, a
special regulation for the cases of financial sanctions; rather it ex-
presses a general principle. 63 By this decision the court has estab-
lished the power of the judicial review of the general decisions of the
High Authority. The importance of this will not be underestimated by
an American reader who knows the importance of Marbury v. Madi-
son. In the lesser field of the ECSC the result is the same.
The judicial control of the EEC and the Euratom is based on
art. 173 of the EEC treaty and art. 146 of the Euratom treaty re-
spectively. The two provisions have exactly the same wording. Thus,
the exercise of judicial control of the two Communities is the same.
There have been no cases yet decided. This is due to the fact that
there have been no individual decisions. Both Communities are still
in a transition period, the EEC in law and Euratom in fact.
The grounds on which the court may annul the actions of the gov-
erning organs of the two Communities are the same as for the ECSC.
These are incompetence, violation of essential formal provisions, vio-
lation of substantive provision and abuse of power. All actions of the
Commissions and the Councils may be attacked by the Councils and
the Commissions respectively as well as by the states. An individual
person may bring an action against the governing organs for individual
decisions on the same grounds and for ordinances as concern them
"directly and individually." This reflects an effort to resolve by this
formulation the difficulties that arose under the ECSC treaty. It was
62 F1d6ration Charboni~re de Belgique v. Hohe Behdrde, Gerichtshof der EGKS,
July 16th 1956, 2 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung 199.
63 Meroni Co. Industrie Mettalurgiche, SPA v. Hohe Beh~rde, Gerichtshof der
Europliischen Gemeinschaften, 4 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung 9 (translation by the
writer).
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successful only in part. It has yet to define "directly and individually."
Art. 184 treaty and art. 156 Euratom treaty establish the power
of judicial review of all ordinances and thus recognize the develop-
ment of the law by the court."
The system of judicial control conforms to the general standard
applied in western states. But the court not only assumes legal pro-
tection, but develops the law and is, therefore, highly important in
the movement toward integration. Only the court settles disputes
concerning the treaties, so it alone decides questions of community
law which arise in cases before a national court." Thus, the uniform
development of the law is assured.
The jurisprudence of the court, which up to now consists only
of judgments concerning the ECSC treaty, seeks to decide cases with-
out binding the future by general definitions and thus to keep the law
flexible enough to meet the necessities of as many situations as possi-
ble. The Communities themselves are not as yet as well established
as the states. They have to find their way through difficult, unexplored
jungles. The law of the Communities must be solid in its principles,
but flexible in special situations. The law would lose its efficiency as a
means of integration if it were committed to certain constructions in
the early stages.
CONCLUSION
The European Communities are only the first step in the direction
of a complete political European unity. What are the results of the
new approach by integration?
First, the states gave up some of their competence in certain fields
and left them to the original power of the communities. They sub-
jected themselves to the power of independent superimposed authori-
ties, thus establishing a vertical legal order.
Second, the inhabitants became direct subjects of the same au-
thorities. The states gave up their exclusive right to bind their in-
habitants. They accepted the authority of the supra-national organs
"to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction." 6 This authority is quasi-constitutional, quasi-legislative
and executive.
However, the communities have not become federal states, their
authority over the states and over individuals is not all embracing. It
is limited to certain fields of action by well defined functions in the
economic sector; the communities are functional international organ-
izations. Their competence is confined to the fulfillment of these func-
64 Infra.
65 Art. 41 ECSC-treaty; art 177 EEC-treaty; art. 150 Euratom-treaty.
66 UN-Charter, Art. 7 par. 2.
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tions. But even inside the field of their functions their competence is
not general. They are confined to certain kinds of actions under deter-
mined conditions. They may not exercise any power that has not been
given to them by a special provision. The vertical legal order of
an integrated community is not a state legal order, but a pre-state,
pre-federal legal order.
The efficacy of the legal provisions depends largely upon the
independence of the communities from the states. We have alluded
to the importance of the question of the identity of the decision-
makers-of the power-centers inside the communities for integration.
It is impossible to treat this question in detail. 7 However, we shall try
to indicate the general lines.
In the ECSC the decision making power is concentrated by the
treaty in the High Authority (art. 14). The Council has only the
right to be heard and in some cases it must give its consent. The
High Authority is an integrated organ. It is absolutely independent of
the governments. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this
that the ECSC is really fully independent. Actually, the states retain
considerable power. We may even say the decisive power is in their
hands. The developments of recent years have led to a certain predomi-
nance of the Council, which represents the states and which retains
the real power. The High Authority does not have enough power to
force the states to follow its direction, but often enough the High
Authority is forced by the states to adopt their proposals. The most
instructive example was the coal crisis of 1959. The High Authority
was not able to push through its plans against the resistance of the
states. Nevertheless, the High Authority in its daily work develops
an independent activity and works for integration.
In the EEC and in Euratom the decision-making power is in the
hands of the Councils (art. 145 EEC treaty and art. 115 Euratom
treaty). The Councils, it may be recalled, are international organs and
their members are bound by the instructions of their governments.
The states in these Communities are predominant. Nevertheless, a
certain independence is guaranteed. The Councils may take action
only upon proposals by the commissions. They may amend these
proposals only by unanimous vote. Thus, the commissions have the
initiative and a certain power of direction. The system inside these
two Communities is a system of checks and balances, mainly because
the Commissions have important executive powers that may be en-
larged by the Councils. The Councils are predominant but not omnip-
otent.
67 For an instructive analysis see Bebr, The Balance of Power in the European
Communities, 5 Annuaire Europ~en-European Yearbook 53-79.
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We may conclude this analysis with the following theses:
(1) The European communities are the first step toward a polit-
ical unification of Europe.
(2) The European communities use for the first time the means
of integration to reach this unification.
(3) The European communities constitute a vertical legal order
and thus are above the states.
(4) The European communities exercise their supra-national func-
tions in the economic field by specially defined authority that
has been transferred to them by the states. The states have
thus limited their own authority.
(5) The European communities are legally independent of the
states, but their decision making process is a mixed process
of community and state power.
(6) The further development of the European communities de-
pends on the enlargement of the powers of the Parliament, a
closer relation between the Parliament and the integrated
organs and an enlargement of the powers of the integrated
organs.
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